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Spanish regional decentralization tightness: leading to a soft budget constraint? 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Recent contributions to the literature on public choice have examined the effects of 
regional fiscal balances and unsuitable decentralization mechanisms on the capability of 
regional governments to make expenditure decisions. As the processes of 
decentralization have accelerated around the world, so too has the research examining 
the economic impact of such processes in terms of efficiency, equity and 
macroeconomic stability (see the survey reported in Rodden, Eskeland and Litvack, 
2003). This in turn has engendered a debate on the costs and benefits of decentralization 
(Prud’homme, 1995; McLure, 1995 and Rodden, 2002, among others). Basically, the 
benefits of decentralization are argued to derive from the greater pressure on local 
administrators and the enhanced perception of costs whereas the arguments against 
decentralization are related to problems of equity, efficiency, migration and 
administrative complexity. 
 
Yet, eventually, it would appear to be the case that the processes of decentralization are 
detrimental to the potential growth of developed regions. Recent empirical studies seem 
to conclude that while decentralization might be beneficial for economic growth in 
developed countries, the opposite is true in the case of developing regions (Davoodi and 
Zou, 1998; Akai and Sakata, 2002, among others). Thus, undesirable decentralization 
mechanisms induce lower growth rates for specific regions. In this way, more 
developed regions can expect to grow more autonomously with regard to central 
transfers. Moreover, Bahl and Linn (1992) point out that decentralization becomes more 
likely with the achievement of a higher stage of economic development. The authors 
argue that there is a relatively high threshold level of economic development at which 
fiscal decentralisation becomes attractive. 
 
Thus, unsuitable decentralization mechanisms lead to a situation of soft budget 
constraints, that is, a scenario in which regional governments have a lower budgetary 
capacity and in which they are more likely to experience a bailout. Pisauro (2001) notes 
that in the presence of a soft budget constraint central governments will take action to   2
solve regional financial difficulties. Therefore, the subsidiarity principle holds to the 
extent that redistribution and stabilization functions are uppermost in the minds of 
central governments. However, fiscal co-ordination between the different levels of 
government is not readily solved for certain specific vertical relations. Yet, in many 
countries, regional governments enjoy sufficient fiscal autonomy to determine for 
themselves their final outcomes. On the other hand, fiscal decentralization may itself 
provide crucial institutional support for market-oriented reforms. 
 
This paper seeks to detect a soft budget constraint operating in the case of Spanish 
regional governments due to the inadequacy of the current decentralization regime. The 
presence of a soft budget constraint would limit budget expenditure destinations by 
means of the central government's decision to decentralize. In such circumstances, the 
regional authorities would be predisposed to seek the intervention of the central 
government. The design of intergovernmental fiscal relations should, therefore, address 
the dual problem of common tax resources and soft budget constraints. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 comments briefly on the evolution of the 
Spanish system of regional decentralization. Section 3, starting from a theoretical 
model, throws light on the model that would have to be estimated in order to detect the 
effects of decentralization on regional budgetary capacity. Section 4 shows empirical 
evidence for Spain’s autonomous communities (ACs). The final section draws together 
the paper’s main conclusions. 
 
2.  A few remarks on Spain's recent process of decentralization 
 
Spain’s process of fiscal decentralization has been conducted asymmetrically since the 
constitution of the 17 ACs that make up the Spanish state. From the outset, a legal 
framework was drawn up whereby the ACs were organized into three groups based 
upon the predisposition of each regional government to assume political responsibilities. 
Implicitly, historical nationalities were, thus, recognised by Spain’s new democratic 
constitution. However, whereas the Basque Country recovered full legislative (foral) 
rights, as did Navarre, other ACs that had played an equally active role in drafting the 
constitutional reports were granted only higher legislative rights. Even so, great steps 
were taken in the process towards decentralization. Indeed, article 158 of the Spanish   3
constitution provided for the creation of Interterritorial Compensation Funds (ICF), 




Therefore, the policy of financing economic differences can be traced back to the 
Constitution. In addition, ultimately, regional responsibilities were defined by means of 
a higher ranking law (LOFCA
iv) and the autonomous statutes of each AC. This system 
upheld the foral communities, which were permitted to operate their pre-established 
economic agreements (quota for the Basque Country and contribution for Navarre). 
These agreements meant that both foral ACs would pay for state services performed 
within their territories. However, the computations for such services have never been 
undertaken in this way and the system remains unmodified since 1981. In recent years, 
complex negotiations have taken place in order to bring the size of these budgets up to 
date since it is the State who has had to bear the brunt of these payments. 
 
However, significant in this respect was the passing of the LOHAPA
v in 1981. The 
socialist party sought to harmonize the creation of the new ACs - with only three 
autonomous statutes having been signed prior to that date - by putting all the ACs on a 
similar footing within the so-called common regime. This attempt at erasing any initial 
differences was of transcendental importance. Finally, in 2002 negotiations were 
initiated in an attempt to reach an agreement on the transfer of the management of 
health and education services, and this has meant that the powers of the ACs are now 
practically the same within the common regime. However, at the same time, Spain's 
devolution of revenue raising powers has lagged behind the rapid decentralization of 
spending competencies. Therefore, considerable imbalances have sprung up between 
tax assignments and expenditure functions, leading in turn to the issue of bailouts from 
the central government. A few ACs have habitually exceeded the 25% limit of debt 
related to current revenues. López-Laborda and Vallés (2001) summarize the factors 
that have led to bailouts in Spanish regions. 
 
                                                 
iii Clearly, those regions that favour regional solidarity support such funds. However, their position is 
somewhat different when it comes to the same issue in which the regions in Eastern Europe stand to be 
the future beneficiaries of European Funds. 
iv Organic Law of the Financing of the ACs. 
v Organic Law for the Harmonization of the Autonomous Process.   4
The funds for financing the ACs of the common regime come from local and shared 
taxes but mainly from funds transferred from the state. These transfers have been 
calculated in accordance with various formulae since 1986, though the latest agreement 
seems to be more uniform and understandable. In spite of this favourable evolution in 
the provision of more resources for the ACs, regional tax capabilities have been 
conditioned by the regions' own economic evolution and their willingness to establish 
surcharges on regional tax quotas. However, the international tendency towards 
diminishing the tax burden does not leave much scope for many individual surcharges. 
In addition, a regional surcharge would favour the fiscal mobility of economic agents. 
Therefore, the Spanish decentralization process should eventually set out clearly defined 
competencies for the various levels of government. 
 
Thus, Spain's system of decentralization would have worsened regional economic 
growth for those regions that benefit least from a process that enhances the evening out 
of state transfers. Economists normally think of re-distributive measures from rich to 
poor in terms of the transfer of income from high- to low-income individuals. Such 
intergovernmental transfers require a somewhat different justification based on social 
values (Oates, 1999). Oates also points out that the equalization of intergovernmental 
grants is bound to have a number of perverse effects. For example, while such grants 
generally transfer income from the wealthy to the poor, they also inevitably result in 
some income transfers from poor individuals residing in wealthy jurisdictions to rich 
individuals living in poor areas. In this sense, such equalizing measures are not as 
effective as programs that redistribute income from rich to poor individuals. 
 
3.  Restricted fiscal capability under decentralization choice based upon transfers. 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide evidence that the transfer system forming part of 
Spain's decentralized state is inadequate to promote decisions as regards subsidization 
or investment expenditures among the ACs. In this sense, Spain's fiscal decentralization 
has been given priority over a transfer system of re-distribution, which has led to 
bailouts and perhaps soft budget constraints at regional levels of government. Given that 
spending decisions are taken at the regional level and, basically, financed with transfers 
from the national government, which modifies tax laws, the mechanism of soft budget 
constraints can be said to be operating under fiscal federalism. The soft budget   5
constraint will tend to encourage greater expenditure than would otherwise occur, 
although the division of that expenditure in terms of quantity, quality and price is 
undetermined. 
 
The concept of the soft budget constraint was first proposed by Kornai (1979, 1980 and 
1986) when referring to the firms operating in socialist regimes that were financed by 
state agencies. A large formal literature on soft budget constraints has developed, much 
of it evolving from Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). Several partial surveys of this 
literature have been produced (Maskin, 1996; Dewatripont, Maskin and Roland, 2000; 
Maskin, 1999; Maskin and Xu, 2001; Roland, 2000). 
 
Finally, the concept has typically been applied in order to explain the dependency 
generated by federalist models of public choice. Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2003) 
present a theoretical model. Following Wildasin (2001), regional administrations of 
limited budgetary size have a reduced capability to promote economic activity inside the 
region and are, therefore, more closely conditioned by policymaking decisions from 
central government. Thus, if regional governments pursue fiscal policies that induce 
bailouts, Wildasin comments that the problem is not that the public sector is too 
decentralized, but rather that it is too centralized. In this sense, institutional reforms that 
move the public sector towards a greater centralization may worsen rather than 
ameliorate the problem of soft budget constraints. However, Qian and Roland (1998) 
point out that there are destabilization effects that have to be compensated by central 
government due to the presence of externalities, although they recognise that 
externalities are also conditioned by smaller budgets. Bordignon (2000) comments that 
several reforms have been introduced with the aim of progressively tightening budget 
constraints on regional governments, through an increase in their financial autonomy 
and a reduction in the transfers paid by the central government. 
 
Starting from the model proposed by Qian and Roland (1998), Timofeev (2002) 
proposes an alternative model in which it is possible to determine whether the behaviour 
of the ACs is conditioned by the revenue gains pattern. Suppose we have a public 
budget that fits the following model: 
   6
T Y I M p c + = + − λτ ) (   (2) 
 
where c refers to the unitary cost of the provision of monopolistic goods, p is the price 
of the monopolistic good and M indicates the consumption level of this good. So, the 
expression (c-p)M could be interpreted as the overall regional government expenditure 
(S). Moreover, the budget is balanced by the percentage (λ) of total revenue that is 
generated inside the region, which is eventually included as part of the regional budget 
plus central government transfers (T). In other words, from the total of regional 
administration resources that are collected regionally (τY), where τ is the tax burden rate 
and Y is the regional output level, only a proportion of this is finally included within the 
regional budget (λ), which could be defined as the tax revenue retention rate. However, 
we believe, in contrast with Timofeev’s model, that the regional budget should include 
an additional variable that takes into consideration the debt (E) that temporary regional 
expenditure decisions might generate without evolving into bailouts. Therefore, 
expression (2) could be considered as follows, where regional investment expenditures 
(I) must also be considered. All variables are considered in per capita terms. 
 
E T Y I S + + = + λτ   (3) 
 
Having identified the initial model, Timofeev (2002) proposes computing the elasticity 
of changes in the per capita amount of regional budget subsidies (note, that here we also 
consider elasticities regarding investment decisions) for changes in the tax revenue 
retention rate, variations in the per capita amount of transfers and changes in regional 
debt decisions. Equation (4) shows these elasticity computations
vi. 
 
) E ( d ) T Y ( d ) ( d dS 2 1 0 γ + + τ γ + λ γ =  
) E ( d ) T Y ( d ) ( d dI 2 1 0 γ + + τ γ + λ γ =  
(4) 
 
The first summand identifies the substitution effect, while the second summand reflects 
the income effect. Finally, the third summand indicates the elasticity of changes in 
expenditure for changes in the amount of regional debt. In this sense, the tax revenue 
                                                 
vi Andrey Timofeev suggested incorporating debt resources with a separate coefficient.   7
retention rate would determine the opportunity cost of subsidization and, thus, affect the 
substitution of local infrastructure expenditure for subsidies. 
 
In the literature, the “flypaper effect” is the name given to the widespread empirical 
tendency for local government expenditure to expand more strongly when (non-
matching) grant income increases than when jurisdictional income per head rises (Oates 
1999). In our model, this coincides with the circumstance that γ0<0 in equation (5). A 
force underlying the flypaper effect is that of the soft budget constraint stemming from 
prospective central government bailouts (Pisauro, 2001). This argument is commonly 
employed by central governments for maintaining central control. 
 
Our static approach is identified in equation (5), where all variables have been defined 
in per capita terms (represented by small case letters). 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) jo jt 2 jo jt j jo 0 1 0 j jt 0 jo jt e e t t y ) ( s s − γ + − + λ ∆ τ γ + λ − λ γ = −
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) jo jt 2 jo jt j jo 0 1 0 j jt 0 jo jt e e t t y ) ( i i − γ + − + λ ∆ τ γ + λ − λ γ = −   (5) 
 
4.  Empirical evidence for the Spanish regions 
 
In our analysis of decentralization in Spain, all the revenue variables were obtained 
from the budget outlay data. The variables used were considered in real terms. Per 
capita subsidies include annual current and capital transfers. For the computation of 
regional tax revenue retentions, we considered the following taxes: personal income tax, 
VAT, the shared special taxes and the ACs’ own taxes. Corporate tax was avoided 
because of obvious conflicts concerning the registered office of the activity. Per capita 
transfers refer to the amounts when considering the fourth and seventh budget chapters 
minus transfers to local corporations managed by ACs and direct transfers from the EU 
to the AC budgets. The amount of debt was established in accordance with data from 
Spain’s Central Bank. Likewise, the sixth budget chapter (real investment expenditure) 
was taken as a proxy of the ACs' investment expenditures. The information corresponds 
to the period 1986-1999. 
 
Below, we describe some of the characteristics of Spain’s system of decentralization in 
order to illustrate its evolution. In order to measure the degree of financial autonomy,   8
we computed the share of a community's own tax resources as a proportion of the total 
resources generated in each AC. We depict this degree of autonomy for the period 
1992-1999 as this was the most stable period in the development of the AC statutes. 
Figure 1 shows the rate of growth in the share of the autonomous financing of budgets 
compared to their initial level in 1992. The foral communities have been excluded from 
the analysis and the Canary Islands appears as an outlier due to their special financing 
agreement with the central government. It can be seen that three regions have not 
achieved a high degree of financial autonomy (Andalusia, Extremadura and Castile-la-
Mancha), whereas Cantabria, the Balearic Islands and, especially, Madrid have 
experienced the highest growth rates. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
Figure 2 shows the evolution in the mean change in tax revenue retention rates versus 
the changes in per capita amount of central government transfers. A quotient of these 
magnitudes reflects individual improvements in unconditional resources for the ACs 
budgets. The results indicate which ACs have obtained the highest transfers from 
central government (the mean values of each AC) related to their mean changes in the 
tax revenue retention rate (normalized by overall mean value). Here again, the foral 
communities and the Canary Islands have been excluded. Results indicate that Valencia 
and La Rioja show the greatest changes in both variables over the average value, 
whereas Galicia shows the highest increment in transfers per capita level. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
In order to obtain evidence about the conditionality of AC expenditure decisions, we 
regressed equation (5) taking control variables into consideration by means of a panel 
data approach. Selected control variables partially explain the evolution in AC 
expenditures. 
 
it t j i it 3 2 1 0 )   or ( X ) e ( d ) t y ( d ) ( d ds ε + β + α α + γ + γ + + τ γ + λ γ =  
it t j i it 3 2 1 0 )   or ( X ) e ( d ) t y ( d ) ( d di ε + β + α α + γ + γ + + τ γ + λ γ =  
(6) 
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The variable controls considered (Xit) were as follows: changes in population density, 
changes in income per capita (measured by GDP per capita), changes in unemployment 
rates and the changes in the shares of human capital attainment (lowest and highest 
levels). As mentioned above, our econometric model adopted a panel data approach 
after controlling for regional effects, where αi refers to fixed regional effects. In 
addition, we considered dummies for detecting heterogeneity in budgetary behaviour 
taking into account fixed regional effects by groups of ACs (αj) depending on their 
initial willingness to assume competencies from within the constitutional framework 
(articles 141 and 153 and foral regimes). A one-province dummy has also been tested. 
βt refers to temporal effects (trend variable) and εit is the model's error component. The 
generalized linear-squares method was used with results consistent with 
heteroskedasticity. 
 
However, there is a problem of endogeneity between dependent variables and the two 
first regressors, which means that the results of equation (6) above are not consistent. 
Instrumental variables must be used in order to explain expenditures by means of 
supply-side and demand-size variables (Zt). We have used the following instrumental 
variables (correlated with the two main regressors): changes in health index prices, 
changes in education prices, changes in the transport cost index (the three variables 
recorded from Inebase), changes in birth rates, changes in mortality rates, changes in 
occupation in the agricultural sector, changes in labour productivity and changes in 
migration rates (we have considered only migration between ACs – we did not include 
foreign migration due to lack of statistical information for the initial years). Bartlett’s 
test results recommend the use of cross-section weights for the two-stage least squares 
estimation. 
 
it t i t 4 it 3 2 1 0 j Z X ) e ( d ) t y ( d ) ( d ds ε + β + α + γ + γ + γ + + τ γ + λ γ =  




Regression results considering changes in per capita subsidies (equation 7.1) are shown 
in Table 1. Fixed effects results were not significant. Our results demonstrate that the 
three main regressors in our model might be considered as being significant in 
explaining the changes in per capita subsidies, albeit that the correlation signs vary. A   10
positive correlation is recorded in regard to the changes in the amounts of decentralized 
resources. Therefore, changes in revenue retention rate and the changes in regional debt 
amounts display a negative correlation sign. Overall, the most important aspect of these 
results is that a switch from lump-sum grants to tax revenue retention had a statistically 
significant, negative effect on the amount of budgetary subsidies. Then, owing to the 
substitution effect, decentralization of the revenue-raising authority reduces 
subsidization, while the income effect of change in available resources provides 
evidence of a positive correlation. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
In addition, changes in the unemployment rate, changes in per capita GDP and the trend 
variable appear to be valid instruments with which to control biased estimates. Indeed, 
changes in unemployment display a negative correlation whereas the other two control 
variables are significant and present a positive sign. Thus, the presence of higher 
unemployment rates leads to lower subsidization per capita expenditure. By contrast, 
higher development leads towards higher expenditure on subsidies. These results 
coincide with previous reports that higher development levels lead to higher necessities 
that must be covered by higher expenditures (Garcia-Milà et al, 2002). Finally, the trend 
variable presents a positive tendency to higher subsidization. However, human capital 
attainment levels, changes in migration rates and changes in density population show no 
significant values. As regards dummies for belonging to a particular regime, only the 
one-province dummy is significant with a negative sign. So, the size of the AC 
contributes to explaining changes in per capita subsidies. 
 
Finally, we computed the marginal propensity to spend on subsidies according to 
Timofeev's (2002) proposition. This propensity composes the marginal propensity to 
spend out of transfers (γ1) and the marginal propensity to spend on subsidies out of an 
equivalent amount of shared taxes (γ0/τY), where τY is the tax burden percentage in 
terms of GDP (we considered the average level for the whole period, taken from OECD 
revenue statistics). 
   11
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Thus, additional euro expenditure in AC budgets, when both shared taxes and central 
government grants are available, increases subsidies by 0.111 €. This leads us to 
conclude that there is a small marginal propensity to spend on subsidies when only 
transfers from  central government (0.154 €) are taken into consideration. Yet, the 
negative relationship between additional improvements in tax revenue retention rates 
and the propensity to subsidize suggests that the decentralization of revenues would be 
more effective. Our model shows therefore the extent of the flypaper effect resulting 
from the assumption that awarding a grant to a community is equivalent to a grant 
awarded directly to the regional residents. The reason underlying this is that regional 
governments could determine autonomously the aggregate size of their budgets. 
However, our estimate shows a lower value than those recorded in the literature (for a 
survey of flypaper effect estimates, see Hines and Thaler, 1995). 
 
Likewise, as pointed out in equation (7.2), we also computed the effects of the same 
exogenous variables with the same instruments on per capita regional investment 
expenditures (see Table 1, column 2). Again, the fixed effects were not significant. In 
this case, changes in per capita investment expenditures are brought about following 
changes in density population, development level and the amount of decentralized 
resources. The sign of the estimated parameter indicates a positive correlation between 
ACs investment budgetary decisions, changes in GDP per capita and the resources 
obtained from central government grants, whereas the other significant results show a 
negative correlation. Therefore, per capita investment would not be dependent on 
changes made in fiscal autonomy by means of additional gains in revenue rates. 
Examination of the dummies for pertaining to a certain regime reveals that the foral and 
151 communities show significant parameters and a negative sign, albeit that this sign 
reflects the decomposition of the non-included constant. Yet, lower estimates of the 
parameters would indicate the greater predisposition of those regions that have in fact 
assumed lower responsibilities. Therefore, in this case, results do not allow us to 
conclude that the decentralization of the revenue-raising authority would lead to a 
reduction in investment due to the non-significance of the estimated parameter. 
   12
5.  Conclusions 
 
Our results suggest that given the negative relationship between additional 
improvements in tax revenue retention rates and the propensity to subsidize, the 
decentralization of revenues would be a more effective measure to adopt. In addition, 
we believe that the expenditure of regional governments should no longer rely on 
transfers from higher levels of government due to the conditioning characteristics of 
central government transfers. This belief is supported not only by the small ACs 
marginal propensities to subsidize (0.153), but, also their propensity to invest (0.063). 
Political decentralization, or devolution, is about creating a domain of autonomy 
involving the transfer of power and resources to lower level authorities, which are 
largely independent of higher levels of government. Though the principle of subsidiarity 
usually comes into play here, other principles such as proximity to voters need to be 
taken into account. Yet, subsidiarity should be rejected when unsuitable systems of 
decentralization conspire to hinder the growth of developed regions and do nothing to 
promote the development of the more backward regions. Moreover, in any 
computations of growth, subsidiarity cannot be accurately measured. In this sense, 
equity provides a better approach, making it more desirable to consider individual 
incomes of both backward and developed regions. 
 
Spanish decentralization is based upon a framework within which the recognition of 
national historical rights remains incomplete. This means that political decentralization 
has yet to be fully achieved. At this point, devolution would be satisfactorily completed 
if the following factor was taken into consideration: the effective responsibility of 
regional governments needs to be respected, which in turn would generate the necessary 
reforms. But until then, Spain's State of Autonomies will continue to lack an 
institutionalized mechanism of co-operation between the Spanish central government 
and the autonomous communities. Present negotiations are considering the financing of 
AC health deficits. The central government prefers to renounce its authority over 
regional revenue-raising rather than to finance health expenditures in the ACs by means 
of additional debt. So, soft budget constraints are still in place.   13
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Figure 1 Growth in share of the ACs own taxes over the total territorial amount taxes 
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Figure 2 Changes over mean: tax revenue retention rate versus per capita transfers 
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Dummy article 143    -5.971 
(4.590) 
Dummy foral regime    -12.396
** 
(5.690) 
Dummy article 151    -7.864
* 
(4.736) 
Dummy uniprovincial level  -4.706
* 
(2.570)   







*** Means statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%. Standard deviation errors are in brackets. 